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Abstract
Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs) extend Answer Set Programming (ASP) with epistemic negation and
have received renewed interest in recent years. This led to the development of new research and efficient
solving systems for ELPs. In practice, ELPs are often written in a modular way, where each module interacts
with other modules by accepting sets of facts as input, and passing on sets of facts as output. An interesting
question then presents itself: under which conditions can such a module be replaced by another one without
changing the outcome, for any set of input facts? This problem is known as uniform equivalence, and has
been studied extensively for ASP. For ELPs, however, such an investigation is, as of yet, missing. In this
paper, we therefore propose a characterization of uniform equivalence that can be directly applied to the
language of state-of-the-art ELP solvers. We also investigate the computational complexity of deciding
uniform equivalence for two ELPs, and show that it is on the third level of the polynomial hierarchy.
1 Introduction
Epistemic Logic Programs (ELPs) (Gelfond 1991; Kahl et al. 2015; Shen and Eiter 2016) add
epistemic operators to the language of Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Gebser et al. 2012;
Brewka et al. 2011; Schaub and Woltran 2018), a generic, fully declarative logic programming
language that allows for encoding problems such that the resulting answers (called answer sets)
directly correspond to solutions of the encoded problem. In ASP, negation is usually interpreted
according to the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988), that is, as negation-as-
failure or default negation. Intuitively, a default negated atom ¬a is true if there is no justifica-
tion for a being true in the same answer set. Hence, default negation is a “local” operator defined
relative to the answer set under consideration. ELPs (as defined in (Shen and Eiter 2016)) extend
ASP with the epistemic negation operator not . An epistemically negated atom not a intuitively
means that atom a cannot be proven to be true, in the sense that it is not true in every answer set.
Epistemic negation is thus defined with respect to a set of answer sets, referred to as a world view.
Deciding whether such a world view exists is Σ3
P
-complete in general (Shen and Eiter 2016),
whereas deciding answer set existence for ASP can be done in Σ2
P
(Eiter and Gottlob 1995), one
level lower on the polynomial hierarchy.
Michael Gelfond (1991; 1994) recognized epistemic negation to be a useful construct for ASP
early on and proceeded to introduce the modal operators K (“known” or “provably true”) and
M (“possible” or “not provably false”) to add this feature to the language. Ka and Ma cor-
respond to ¬not a and not¬a, respectively. Renewed interest in recent years has revealed
several flaws in the original semantics, and various new approaches (cf. e.g. (Gelfond 2011;
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Truszczynski 2011; Kahl 2014; Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015; Shen and Eiter 2016)) were pro-
posed. Also, several efficient and practical ELP solving systems have been and continue to be
developed (Kahl et al. 2015; Son et al. 2017; Bichler et al. 2018).
An interesting question in the context of ELPs is when two programs are equivalent. Stan-
dard (sometimes also called ordinary or classical) equivalence is simply defined as two programs
having the same world views. However, as for ASP but unlike for classical logic, this notion
does not capture replaceability of ELPs. In order to be able to capture when a program is re-
placeable by another one, the context in which the replacement is done has to be taken into
account. The notion of strong equivalence captures replaceability in any context. Strong equiva-
lence is a well-studied topic in ASP (there the context can be any set of ASP rules) with several
useful applications (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Turner 2003; Cabalar et al. 2007; Lin and Chen 2007;
Eiter et al. 2013). An analogous notion has also been studied more recently for ELPs (in that case,
the context can be any set of ELP rules) (Wang and Zhang 2005; Farin˜as del Cerro et al. 2015;
Faber et al. 2019).
For some applications, other notions of equivalence between these two extremes (no context
for standard equivalence, any context for strong equivalence) are desirable. The most prominent
of these intermediate equivalences is uniform equivalence, where the context is restricted to facts.
This notion had been proposed for Datalog originally (Sagiv 1988; Maher 1988) and has been
studied for ASP quite extensively as well (Eiter and Fink 2003; Eiter et al. 2004; Eiter et al. 2005).
The notion of uniform equivalence is of course most suitable when considering a full program
that is applied to various scenarios, which are represented as factual knowledge, or a program that
serves as a fixed knowledge base for an agent, which then uses it together with percepts repre-
sented as facts. The concept is also useful for modular ASP programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994;
Oikarinen 2007; Janhunen et al. 2009), where sub-programs interact with each other by accept-
ing a set of input facts and returning a set of output facts.
While uniform equivalence has been widely studied for ASP, such an investigation is, to the
best of the authors’ knowledge, still lacking for ELPs.
Example 1
From (Faber et al. 2019), we take the example of formulating the well-known Closed World As-
sumption via ELP rules. Two formulations of the CWA have been proposed in this context. In
(Gelfond 1991), a rule for CWA is proposed that, in the language of ELPs, can be formulated as
p′ ← ¬not¬p.
Intuitively, this says that p′ (meaning the negation of p) shall be true if there is no possible world
where p is true. In (Shen and Eiter 2016), a different rule is proposed:
p′ ← not p.
Here, intuitively, p′ shall be true if there is a possible world where p is false. While the two
formulations are equivalent in that they share the same world views, in (Faber et al. 2019), it was
shown that they are, however, not strongly equivalent. However, this does not tell us anything
about the uniform equivalence of these two rules.
In order to analyze cases like the one presented in Example 1 above, it is the aim of this
paper to study uniform equivalence for ELPs, that is, the question of whether, given two ELPs
Π1 and Π2, for any set of facts D, the combined programs Π1 ∪ D and Π2 ∪ D have the same
world views. According to (Faber et al. 2019), two versions of (ordinary) equivalence between
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ELPs can be defined: one where all candidate world views are equal, and one where only the
world views (that is, candidate world views that minimize the number of assumptions) are equal.
In (Faber et al. 2019), two versions of strong equivalence, relative to these ordinary equivalence
notions, are defined, and then subsequently shown to coincide.We will follow the same approach.
Interestingly, we will see that for uniform equivalence, the two versions do not coincide.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• We formally define two versions of uniform equivalence for ELPs (based on the input
language of today’s ELP solvers) that appropriately extend uniform equivalence for ASP,
based on existing notions of equivalence for ELPs, as used in (Faber et al. 2019).
• We provide an analysis of the two different notions of uniform equivalence for ELPs and
characterize their relationship. Furthermore, a model-theoretic characterization is offered,
based on a so-called UE-function, in the same vein as the SE-function was introduced in
(Faber et al. 2019) to characterize strong equivalence.
• We then show that testing uniform equivalence of two ELPs is ΠP3 -complete, that is, the
complexity of this test jumps up one level on the polynomial hierarchy compared to ASP,
and hence is much harder than testing strong equivalence, which for ELPs is only CONP-
complete (Faber et al. 2019).
Organization. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of the relevant definitions needed in the main sections of the paper, including the language of
ASP, ELPs, and the notions of strong and uniform equivalence for the former. Section 3 defines
two different notions of uniform equivalence for ELPs, shows that, in contrast to strong equiva-
lence, these notions do not coincide, and finally offers a model-theoretic characterization of these
notions of uniform equivalence, called the UE-function. Following this characterization, we in-
vestigate the computational complexity of deciding uniform equivalence in Section 4. We then
offer some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Answer Set Programming (ASP). A ground logic program with nested negation (also called an-
swer set program, ASP program, or, simply, logic program) is a pair Π = (A,R), where A is a
set of propositional (i.e. ground) atoms andR is a finite set of rules of the form
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ al ← al+1, . . . , am,¬ℓ1, . . . ,¬ℓn; (1)
where the comma symbol stands for conjunction, 0 ≤ l ≤ m, 0 ≤ n, ai ∈ A for all 1 ≤ i ≤
m, and each ℓi is a literal, that is, either an atom a or its (default) negation ¬a for any atom
a ∈ A. Note that, therefore, doubly negated atoms may occur. We will sometimes refer to such
rules as standard rules. Each rule r ∈ R of form (1) consists of a head H (r) = {a1, . . . , al}
and a body B(r) = {al+1, . . . , am,¬ℓ1, . . . ,¬ℓn}. We denote the positive body by B+(r) =
{al+1, . . . , am}. A rule where l = 1,m = l, and n = 0 is called a fact.
An interpretation I (over A) is a set of atoms, that is, I ⊆ A. A literal ℓ is true in an inter-
pretation I ⊆ A, denoted I  ℓ, if a ∈ I and ℓ = a, or if a 6∈ I and ℓ = ¬a; otherwise ℓ is
false in I , denoted I 6 ℓ. Finally, for some literal ℓ, we define that I  ¬ℓ if I 6 ℓ. This notation
naturally extends to sets of literals. An interpretationM is called a model of r, denotedM  r,
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if, wheneverM  B(r), it holds thatM  H (r). We denote the set of models of r by mods(r);
the models of a logic program Π = (A,R) are given by mods(Π) =
⋂
r∈Rmods(r). We also
write I  r (resp. I  Π) if I ∈ mods(r) (resp. I ∈ mods(Π)).
The GL-reduct ΠI of a logic program Π = (A,R) with respect to an interpretation I is the
program (A,RI), whereRI = {H (r)← B+(r) | r ∈ R, ∀¬ℓ ∈ B(r) : I  ¬ℓ}.
Definition 2
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Lifschitz et al. 1999) M ⊆ A is an
answer set of a logic program Π if (1)M ∈ mods(Π) and (2) there is no subsetM ′ ⊂ M such
thatM ′ ∈ mods(ΠM ).
The set of answer sets of a logic program Π is denoted by AS (Π). The consistency problem
of ASP, that is, to decide whether for a given logic program Π it holds that AS(Π) 6= ∅, is Σ2
P
-
complete (Eiter and Gottlob 1995), and remains so also in the case where doubly negated atoms
are allowed in rule bodies (Pearce et al. 2009).
Strong and Uniform Equivalence for Logic Programs. Two logic programs Π1 = (A,R1) and
Π2 = (A,R2) are equivalent iff they have the same set of answer sets, that is, AS(Π1) =
AS(Π2). The two logic programs are strongly equivalent iff for any third logic program Π =
(A,R) it holds that the combined logic program Π1 ∪ Π = (A,R1 ∪ R) is equivalent to the
combined logic program Π2 ∪ Π = (A,R2 ∪ R). They are uniformly equivalent iff they are
strongly equivalent for any third programΠ consisting only of facts. An SE-model (Turner 2003)
of a logic programΠ = (A,R) is a tuple of interpretations (X,Y ), whereX ⊆ Y ⊆ A, Y  Π,
andX  ΠY . The set of SE-models of a logic programΠ is denoted SE(Π). Note that for every
model Y of Π, (Y, Y ) is an SE-model of Π, since Y  Π implies that Y  ΠY . An SE-model
(X,Y ) of Π is a UE-model of Π (Eiter and Fink 2003) iff either X = Y , or X ⊂ Y and there
is no other SE-model (X ′, Y ) ∈ SE(Π) such that X ⊂ X ′ ⊂ Y . The set of UE-models of Π is
denoted UE(Π). Hence, UE-models are precisely those SE-models, where the X component is
either Y , or subset-maximal w.r.t. the other SE-models.
Two logic programs (over the same set of atoms) are uniformly equivalent iff they have the
sameUE-models and checking uniform equivalence isΠP
2
-complete in general (Eiter and Fink 2003).
Epistemic Logic Programs. An epistemic literal is a formula not ℓ, where ℓ is a literal and
not is the epistemic negation operator. A ground epistemic logic program (ELP) is a triple
Π = (A, E ,R), where A is a set of propositional atoms, E is a set of epistemic literals over the
atomsA, andR is a finite set of ELP rules, which are
a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ← ℓ1, . . . , ℓm, ξ1, . . . , ξj ,¬ξj+1, . . . ,¬ξn,
where each ai ∈ A is an atom, each ℓi is a literal, and each ξi ∈ E is an epistemic literal. Note
that usually E is defined implicitly to be the set of all epistemic literals appearing in the rules
R; however, making the domain of epistemic literals explicit will prove useful for our purposes.
The union of two ELPs Π1 = (A1, E1,R1) and Π2 = (A2, E2,R2) is the ELP Π1 ∪ Π2 =
(A1 ∪ A2, E1 ∪ E2,R1 ∪R2).
For a set E of epistemic literals, a subset Φ ⊆ E of epistemic literals is called an epistemic
guess (or, simply, a guess). The following definition provides a way to check whether a set of
interpretations is compatible with a guess Φ.
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Definition 3
LetA be a set of atoms, E be a set of epistemic literals overA, andΦ ⊆ E be an epistemic guess.
A set I of interpretations overA is called Φ-compatible w.r.t. E , iff
1. I 6= ∅;
2. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ Φ, there exists an interpretation I ∈ I such that
I 6 ℓ; and
3. for each epistemic literal not ℓ ∈ E \ Φ, for all interpretations I ∈ I it holds that
I  ℓ.
For an ELPΠ = (A, E ,R), the epistemic reduct (Shen and Eiter 2016) of the programΠw.r.t.
a guess Φ, denoted ΠΦ, consists of the rules RΦ = {r¬ | r ∈ R}, where r¬ is defined as the
rule r ∈ R where all occurrences of epistemic literals not ℓ ∈ Φ are replaced by ⊤, and all
remaining epistemic negation symbols not are replaced by default negation ¬. Note that, after
this transformation, ΠΦ = (A,RΦ) is a logic program without epistemic negation1. This leads
to the following, central definition.
Definition 4
Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP. A set M of interpretations over A is a candidate world view
(CWV) of Π if there is an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E such thatM = AS (ΠΦ) andM is compatible
with Φ w.r.t. E . The set of all CWVs of an ELP Π is denoted by cwv (Π).
Let us consider an example for illustrative purposes.
Example 5
Let A = {p, p′}, E = {not¬p}, Π = (A, E ,R) with R containing only rule p′ ← ¬not¬p, a
well-known formulation of the closed world assumption proposed in (Gelfond 1991)2.
We obtain cwv (Π) = {{{p′}}} as guess Φ = ∅ is compatible with AS (ΠΦ = {p′ ← ¬p}) =
{{p′}}, while no other guesses are compatible with the answer sets of the respective epistemic
reducts.
Following the principle of knowledge minimization, a world view, in (Shen and Eiter 2016),
is defined as follows.
Definition 6
Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP. C ∈ cwv(Π) is called world view (WV) of Π if its associated
guess Φ is subset-maximal, i.e. there is no C′ ∈ cwv (Π) with associated guess Φ′ ⊃ Φ.
Note that in Example 5 there is only one CWV per program; hence the associated guesses are
subset-maximal, and the sets of CWVs and WVs coincide.
Note that given two ELPs Π1 = (A1, E1,R1) and Π2 = (A2, E2,R2), we can always assume
that A1 = A2 and E1 = E2 without changing the (candidate) world views of the two programs
(Faber et al. 2019). In order to simplify our investigation, we will make use of this assumption
when we compare two ELPs.
One of the main reasoning tasks regarding ELPs is the world view existence problem, that is,
given an ELP Π, decide whether a WV (or, equivalently, CWV) exists. This problem is ΣP
3
-
complete (Shen and Eiter 2016).
1 In fact, ΠΦ may contain triple-negated atoms ¬¬¬a. But, according to the definition of the GL-reduct in
(Lifschitz et al. 1999), such formulas are equivalent to simple negated atoms ¬a, and we treat them as such.
2 In fact, in (Gelfond 1991), the author proposes the rule ∼ p ← ¬Mp, where ∼ is a third kind of negation, usually
referred to as strong negation, not considered in this paper. It can be simulated by replacing occurrences of ∼ p by a
fresh atom p′ and adding a constraint rule← p, p′ that excludes p and p′ to hold simultaneously.
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3 Uniform Equivalence for ELPs
In this section, we will investigate the uniform equivalence of ELPs, in particular, focusing on
how to extend this concept (Eiter and Fink 2003) from logic programs to ELPs. In order to be-
gin this investigation, we will first define (ordinary) equivalence of two ELPs. The following
definition was recently proposed in (Faber et al. 2019).
Definition 7
Two ELPs areWV-equivalent (resp.CWV-equivalent) iff their world views (resp. candidate world
views) coincide.
Note that CWV-equivalence immediately implies WV-equivalence.
We now continue by defining uniform equivalence for ELPs. One motivation for such a kind
of equivalence is module optimization: we would like to replace a module in an ELP, that ac-
cepts a set of input facts and provides a set of output facts, with another (hopefully more ef-
ficient) formulation without changing the semantics (i.e. WVs or CWVs). Based on the two
equivalence notions defined above and using ideas from work done in the area of logic programs
(Eiter and Fink 2003), we propose two notions of uniform equivalence for ELPs.
Definition 8
Let Π1 and Π2 be two ELPs. Π1 and Π2 are
• uniformly WV-equivalent iff, for every set of ground facts D, Π1 ∪ D and Π2 ∪ D are
WV-equivalent; and
• uniformly CWV-equivalent iff, for every set of ground facts D, Π1 ∪ D and Π2 ∪ D are
CWV-equivalent.
One could be tempted to define uniform equivalence for ELPs simply in terms of the UE-
models (Eiter and Fink 2003) of the epistemic reducts, for each possible epistemic guess. How-
ever, this approach does not capture our intentions, as the following example shows:
Example 9
Take the two ELPs Π1 and Π2
Π1 = (A, E ,R1) Π2 = (A, E ,R2)
R1 = {p← not p} R2 = {p← ¬p}
with A = {p} and E = {not p}. Now, for the guess Φ1 = ∅, note that Π
Φ1
1 = Π
Φ1
2 and hence,
trivially, the UE-models are also the same. However, for the guess Φ2 = E , Π
Φ2
1 consists of the
rule p ← ⊤, while ΠΦ22 reduces to p ← ¬p. It can be checked that the UE-models of these two
epistemic reducts w.r.t. Φ2 are not the same and are hence not uniformly equivalent in the sense
of (Eiter and Fink 2003). However, it turns out that the guess Φ2 can never give rise to a CWV,
since it requires that there is an answer set not containing p, but both ΠΦ21 and Π
Φ2
2 require that
p is true in all answer sets of the CWV.
The example above implies that, when establishing uniform equivalence for ELPs, we need a
more involved construction. Before we turn to the subject of the characterization, however, we
will first investigate the relationship between uniform CWV and WV-equivalence.
Clearly, it holds that uniform CWV-equivalence is the stronger notion, as it directly implies
uniform WV-equivalence. It can be shown that this relationship is strict, and hence the two no-
tions are actually distinct, as the following proposition states:
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Proposition 10
Let Π1 and Π2 be two ELPs. It holds that
1. when Π1 and Π2 are uniformly CWV-equivalent, then they are uniformly WV-
equivalent; and
2. the ELPs Π1 and Π2 may be such that Π1 and Π2 are uniformly WV-equivalent but
not uniformly CWV-equivalent.
Proof
(1) As observed after Definition 7, if two ELPs are CWV-equivalent then they areWV-equivalent.
This holds, in particular, for any set of facts D, and the ELPs Π1 ∪D and Π2 ∪D.
(2) We will prove this by example. Take the ELPs Π1 = (A, E ,R1) and Π2 = (A, E ,R2) built
as follows. LetR be the following set of rules:
R = {a ∨ b← not¬a,not¬b;
a← b;
b← a;
c← d,¬a,¬b;
d← c,¬a,¬b}
Now, let
R1 = R∪ {c ∨ d← ¬a,¬b}
R2 = R∪ {c← ¬d,¬a,¬b; d← ¬c,¬a,¬b}.
We will show that Π1 and Π2 are uniformlyWV-equivalent, but not uniformly CWV-equivalent.
Note thatA = {a, b, c, d} and E = {not¬a,not¬b}. To prove our claim, let us first examine
the first three rules ofR. From these rules, it is not difficult to check that there are two epistemic
guesses that lead to CWVs, namely Φ1 = ∅ and Φ2 = E . The CWV for Φ2 is the set {{a, b}}.
Note that Φ2 is subset-maximal, and hence this set is also a WV. Note further that adding any set
of facts D ⊆ A to Π1 or Π2 will simply change the WV to {{a, b} ∪ D}, which is still a valid
WV w.r.t. guessΦ2 for both ELPs. However, the CWVs w.r.t. guessΦ1 differ already forD = ∅:
for Π1 ∪D it is {{a, b, c, d}}, whereas for Π2 ∪D no CWV exists. Hence, we have that Π1 and
Π2 are uniformly WV-equivalent, but not uniformly CWV-equivalent, as desired.
The above result shows an interesting distinction between uniform equivalence and strong
equivalence when regarding ELPs. As shown in (Faber et al. 2019), the different notions of
strong equivalence considered therein coincide (that is, regarding strong equivalence w.r.t. WVs
or CWVs does not make a difference), this is not the case for uniform equivalence, where there
is an actual distinction between uniform CWV- and uniform WV-equivalence.
A further observation that can be made is that both forms of uniform equivalence for ELPs
strictly generalize the notion of uniform equivalence for ASP, as the following result shows.
Theorem 11
Let Π1 = (A,R1) and Π2 = (A,R2) be two logic programs, and Π
′
1 = (A, E ,R1) and
Π′2 = (A, E ,R2) be two ELPs containing the same rules, respectively, and where E = ∅. Then,
the following three statements are equivalent:
1. Π1 and Π2 are uniformly equivalent,
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2. Π′1 and Π
′
2 are uniformly CWV-equivalent, and
3. Π′1 and Π
′
2 are uniformly WV-equivalent.
Proof
Note that, since E = ∅, both ELPs Π′1 and Π
′
2 have at most one CWV (and hence WV), namely
the set AS (Π1) and AS(Π2), respectively, in case these sets are non-empty. Otherwise, if Π1 or
Π2 is inconsistent, then Π
′
1 or Π
′
2 do not have any CWVs, respectively.
(2)⇔ (3). Since Π′1 and Π
′
2 have at most one CWV that corresponds to the guess Φ = E = ∅,
the notions of uniformWV-equivalence and uniform CWV-equivalence coincide.
(1)⇒ (2). By assumption,Π1 andΠ2 are uniformly equivalent. Towards a contradiction, assume
that there is a set of factsD ⊆ A, such that Π′1 ∪D is not CWV-equivalent to Π
′
2 ∪D. Note that,
since the only epistemic guess possible is the guess Φ = E = ∅, any non-empty set of answer
sets satisfies Φ. Further, note that for i ∈ {1, 2} it holds that (Π′i ∪D)
Φ = Π′Φi ∪D = Πi ∪D.
Hence, we have that AS(Π1 ∪D) 6= AS(Π2 ∪D), contradicting our assumption.
(2)⇒ (1). This follows from a similar argument as the one above.
Having defined the notions of uniform equivalence for ELPs, we aim to characterize it in
a similar fashion as was done for strong equivalence for ELPs in (Faber et al. 2019), and for
logic programs in (Turner 2003). Unfortunately, it seems that an “interesting” characterization,
as in these two papers, is not possible for uniform equivalence of ELPs. Due to the complex
interactions between epistemic guesses, answer sets, and the sets of facts added, only a very
straightforward characterization of uniform equivalence for ELPs is possible. We formulate this
as a so-called UE-function, in the spirit of the SE-function for strong equivalence as given in
(Faber et al. 2019).
Definition 12
Let Π = (A, E ,R) be an ELP, and let W ∈ {CWV,WV}. Then, UEWΠ : 2
E × 2A → 2A is
called theW -UE-function of Π iff, for any epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E and any set of facts D ⊆ A,
it holds that
UEWΠ (Φ, D) =
{
M ifM is a CWV of typeW of Π w.r.t. Φ
∅ otherwise,
whereM = AS((Π ∪D)Φ).
As can be seen, the characterization is rather straightforward (for a given ELP Π, it maps an
epistemic guess and a set of facts to the CWV or WV that arises w.r.t. the guess when adding
the set of facts to Π). The following result follows immediately from the construction of the
UE-function:
Theorem 13
ForW ∈ {CWV,WV}, two ELPs Π1 and Π2 areW -equivalent iff theirW -UE-functions coin-
cide.
While this characterization thus is far less interesting than the characterization for strong
equivalence, it seems that the multiple layers involved in computing world views of ELPs make
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a more interesting construction, which tries to directly use UE-models from classical logic pro-
gramming (Eiter and Fink 2003), impossible. Further evidence of this will be presented in the
next section, where we investigate the computational complexity of deciding uniform equiv-
alence. While deciding strong equivalence for ELPs is CONP-complete, we will see that the
same task for uniform equivalence is much harder, making it unlikely that an elegant compact
representation, like the UE-models proposed in (Eiter and Fink 2003), or the SE-function from
(Faber et al. 2019) can be found.
Before turning our attention to this topic, however, let us briefly return to our example from
Section 1. Recall that in Example 1, we have seen two versions to formulate the CWA using
ELPs. We shall investigate these two formulations w.r.t. their uniform equivalence.
Example 14
It turns out that the two formulations of CWA shown in Example 1 are in fact both uniformly
CWV-equivalent and uniformly WV-equivalent ELPs. This can be verified by constructing the
relevant UE-functions. Let ΠGelfond = (A, E ,RGelfond) be the formulation of the CWA from
(Gelfond 1991), andΠShenEiter = (A, E ,RShenEiter) be the formulation from (Shen and Eiter 2016),
where A = {p′, p} and E = {not p,not¬p}. Omitting all combinations of epistemic guesses
and sets of facts where the UE-functions return ∅, the UE-functions, for bothW ∈ {WV,CWV},
look as follows:
UEWΠGelfond = UE
W
ΠShenEiter
= {
({not p}, ∅, {{p′}}),
({not p}, {p′}, {{p′}}),
({not¬p}, {p}, {{p′, p}}),
({not¬p}, {p′, p}, {{p′, p}})
}
From this, since the UE-functions for the two formulations coincide, we observe that in the
context of uniform equivalence, these two formulations are, for all intents and purposes, inter-
changeble.
With the above example, we are able to formally establish the following result, comparing
our notions of uniform equivalence for ELPs to established notions of equivalence. We observe
that, as expected, uniform equivalence is strictly stronger than (ordinary) equivalence, but strictly
weaker than strong equivalence.
Theorem 15
For ELPs, it holds that
1. strong equivalence is strictly stronger than uniform CWV-equivalence;
2. uniform CWV-equivalence is strictly stronger than uniformWV-equivalence;
3. uniform CWV-equivalence is strictly stronger than (ordinary) CWV-equivalence;
4. uniformWV-equivalence is strictly stronger than (ordinary) WV-equivalence.
Proof
Several observations follow trivially from the relevant definitions: strong equivalence implies
uniform CWV-equivalence (since sets of atoms are also ELPs), which clearly implies uniform
WV-equivalence (since WVs are a subset of CWVs). Finally, since uniform CWV-equivalence
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(resp. WV-equivalence) require that the CWVs (resp. WVs) are the same for any set of added
atoms—in particular, the empty set of atoms—they directly imply (ordinary) CWV-equivalence
(resp. WV-equivalence).
To establish that the separations between these equivalence notions are indeed strict, we make
use of several separating examples. Statement (1) is shown by Examples 1 and 14, which exhibit
two ELPs that are uniformly CWV-equivalent, but not strongly equivalent. Statement (2) follows
from statement (2) of Proposition 10. Finally, statements (3) and (4) follow from the fact that
uniform CWV-equivalence and uniform WV-equivalence both generalize uniform equivalence
for ground logic programs (cf. Theorem 11), and, in this case, uniform equivalence is already
strictly stronger than ordinary equivalence; see e.g. (Eiter and Fink 2003, Example 10).
4 Complexity of ELP Uniform Equivalence
Having defined our characterization of uniform equivalence for ELPs, in this section, we will
now focus on the question of the computational complexity of deciding whether two ELPs are
uniformly equivalent. It turns out that this task is of similar hardness as deciding the CWV ex-
istence problem for ELPs, that is, on the third level of the polynomial hierarchy. Hence, it is
one level higher in the polynomial hierarchy than for plain ground (disjunctive) logic programs
under the stable model semantics, for which uniform-equivalence checking is ΠP2 -complete
(Eiter and Fink 2003, Theorem 10). The following result states this formally:
Theorem 16
Deciding uniform CWV-equivalence of two ELPs is ΠP
3
-complete.
Proof
For this proof, assume that Π1 = (A, E ,R1) and Π2 = (A, E ,R2) are two ELPs (w.l.o.g. over
the same set of atoms and epistemic literals).
Upper Bound. As stated in (Shen and Eiter 2016, Theorem 4), given an epistemic guess Φ and
an ELP Π, verifying that Π has a CWV w.r.t. Φ can be done in DP
2
, and hence via two calls to
a ΣP
2
oracle. We therefore obtain a straightforward guess-and-check algorithm that runs in non-
deterministic polynomial time with a ΣP
2
oracle, checks non-uniform equivalence between two
ELPs, and works as follows: guess a set of atoms D ⊆ A, an epistemic guess Φ ⊆ E , and a set
of factsM ⊆ A. Then, use a ΣP
2
-oracle to check that one of the following two conditions hold:
(i) Φ leads to a CWV forΠ1 ∪D, but not for Π2 ∪D, or (ii) Φ leads to a CWV for bothΠ1 ∪D
and Π2 ∪D, but thatM is an answer set that exists only in exactly one of these two CWVs.
Lower Bound. We will show ΠP
3
-hardness via reduction from 3-QBF solving. We will construct
two ELPs Π1 and Π2 such that they are uniformly equivalent iff a given 3-QBF is unsatisfi-
able. To this end, we will make use of the reduction from 3-QBF solving to CWV existence
offered in (Shen and Eiter 2016, Proof of Theorem 5), on which our reduction is based. Let
∃X∀Y∃Z Ψ(X,Y,Z) be a 3-QBF formula in conjunctive normal form, where each clause
has the form ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3, where each ℓ is a literal over the variables in X ∪ Y ∪ Z. In
(Shen and Eiter 2016), it is assumed w.l.o.g. that the 3-QBF evaluates to true whenever all vari-
ables inY are replaced by⊤. This does not change the hardness of the problem, and we make use
of the same assumption. For a 3-QBF formula as above, we construct the ELP Π1 = (A, E ,R1)
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over the atoms A = {w,w | w ∈ X ∪Y ∪ Z} ∪ {false, sat} using the well-known technique
of saturation (Eiter and Gottlob 1995). Π1 contains the following set of rules, where ℓ
∗ converts
a literal a into atom a and literal ¬a into atom a:
• for each x ∈ X:
x← notx, (2)
x← notx; (3)
• for each y ∈ Y:
y ← ¬y, (4)
y ← ¬y, (5)
⊥ ← ¬not y, (6)
⊥ ← ¬not y; (7)
• for each z ∈ Z:
z ∨ z, (8)
z ← sat , (9)
z ← sat ; (10)
• for each clause ℓ1 ∨ ℓ2 ∨ ℓ3 in Ψ:
sat ← ℓ∗1, ℓ
∗
2, ℓ
∗
3; (11)
• and the two rules
false ← not false ,not¬sat , (12)
⊥ ← ¬not false. (13)
The construction of Π2 = (A, E ,R2) differs from Π1 in only one respect: for Π2, ℓ∗ converts
literals into ⊤. Note that, therefore, Π2 contains the fact sat . This completes the main part of
our construction. Let us now explore how our construction works. From (Shen and Eiter 2016),
we have that program Π1 has a CWV iff the 3-QBF ∃X∀Y∃ZΨ is satisfiable, and hence, con-
versely, Π1 has no CWVs iff the QBF is unsatisfiable (since, in this case, in the GL-reduct,
the atom sat is always derived, and hence, constraint (12) destroys any potential CWV). Note
that any CWV M for Π1 has the following structure: a guess Φ leading to M will contain a
subset of {notx,notx | x ∈ X} representing an assignment on the variables of X. Further,
Φ ⊇ {not y,not y | y ∈ Y}, since each answer set in the CWV represents precisely one
assignment on the variables Y, and all possible such assignments must appear in the CWV. Fi-
nally, not false ∈ Φ and not¬sat 6∈ Φ, via constraint (12). For the precise reasoning behind
this construction, please see (Shen and Eiter 2016, Proof of Theorem 5).
Towards our goal, we must show two things: (a) in cases where the 3-QBF ∃X∀Y∃ZΨ is
satisfiable, there exists a set of atoms D ⊆ A, such that Π1 ∪D and Π2 ∪D are not equivalent
(i.e. have differing CWVs), and hence, Π1 and Π2 are not uniformly equivalent; and (b) in cases
where the 3-QBF is unsatisfiable for all sets of factsD ⊆ A it holds that Π1 ∪D is equivalent to
Π2 ∪D (i.e. they have the same CWVs), and hence, Π1 and Π2 are uniformly equivalent.
Showing (a) is straightforward: simply take D = ∅. Π1 has a CWV (via correctness of the
reduction in (Shen and Eiter 2016) as explained above), whereasΠ2 does not have a CWV, since
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the atom sat is always derived in any GL-reduct ofΠ2, destroying each potential CWV. Showing
(b) is a little more involved. We will show this by contradiction. To this end, assume that the 3-
QBF is unsatisfiable, but some set of facts D ⊆ A exists, such that Π1 ∪ D and Π2 ∪ D are
not equivalent. Our plan is to show that D cannot contain any atoms from A, but also cannot be
empty. Let us look at the atoms in A in turn.
sat ∈ D: in this case, the only difference between Π1 and Π2, namely rules of the form (11),
disappears, and hence, Π1 ∪D and Π2 ∪D cannot have differing CWVs; a contradiction.
false ∈ D: in this case, the atom false is true in every answer set, regardless of the epistemic
guess Φ, in both Π1 ∪ D and Π2 ∪ D. Hence, not false 6∈ Φ. But then, rule (13) becomes
⊥ ← ¬¬false in the epistemic reduct w.r.t. Φ, and no answer set can both contain D and
satisfy this constraint; a contradiction.
{y, y | y ∈ Y} ∩D 6= ∅: this case is similar to the case of false . If any such atom y or y is in
D, and hence true in every answer set of any epistemic reduct, then constraints (6) and (7) will
prevent that epistemic reduct from having any answer sets for bothΠ1 andΠ2; a contradiction.
D ⊆ {w,w | w ∈ X ∪ Z}: since the 3-QBF is unsatisfiable, we know that for any assignment
on the variables in X and Z there is an assignment on the variables in Y such that Ψ is false.
Since, from the last paragraph, we know that D ∩ {y, y | y ∈ Y} = ∅, we have that whatever
assignment on the variables X and Z is fixed via the atoms in D (in particular, also when
D = ∅), there will always be an assignment on the variables Y, represented by the atoms
{y, y | y ∈ Y}, such that the atom sat will be derived in the GL reduct ofΠ1∪D, irrespective
of the guessΦ, and hence the assignment on the variablesX. Hence, again,Π1∪D andΠ2∪D
have no CWVs; a contradiction.
We thus have that D cannot be empty, but also cannot contain any atoms from A, and hence,
cannot exist. Since, by construction, all CWVs of Π1 and Π2 are also WVs (as the respective
epistemic guesses are never in a subset-relationship), the above holds for both uniform CWV-
and uniformWV-equivalence. This concludes the proof.
From the proof of the above theorem, we immediately obtain the following statement for uni-
form WV-equivalence, which follows from the fact that our lower-bound construction employs
an encoding for 3-QBF where the set of WVs and CWVs always coincide, and hence, the two
ELPs Π1 and Π2 in this construction are uniformly WV-equivalent iff they are uniformly CWV-
equivalent.
Theorem 17
Deciding uniformWV-equivalence for two ELPs is ΠP3 -hard.
Note, however, that our upper bound construction does not give an upper bound for uniform
WV-equivalence, since verifying that some CWV is aWV isΠP
3
-hard itself (Shen and Eiter 2016).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have defined and studied the notion of uniform equivalence for epistemic logic
programs. Programs are uniformlyWV- or CWV-equivalent if they yield the same world views or
candidate world views, respectively. In contrast to strong equivalence for ELPs, the two notions
(for WV and CWV) do not coincide, but they generalize uniform equivalence for standard logic
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programs interpreted using the Answer Set semantics. We also provided a characterization of
both notions of uniform equivalence by means of a UE-function, in the spirit of the SE-function
of (Faber et al. 2019). However, unlike the SE-function this characterization is relatively straight-
forward and provides only little insight into the problem. While this reduces the potential impact
of the characterization, it appears that one cannot do better. In fact, we show that deciding uni-
form equivalence on ELPs is at least ΠP3 -hard and thus probably much harder than deciding
strong equivalence on ELPs, which is CONP-complete. This result provides a further indication
that a more compact representation of the UE-function is unlikely to exist.
For future work, it would be interesting to see whether other forms of equivalences between
ELPs exist that are less restrictive than strong equivalence but more restrictive than uniform
equivalence, and, ideally, for which the decision problem also lies between the respective com-
plexities of deciding uniform and strong equivalence.
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